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Commerce first taught nations to see with good will the
wealth and prosperity of one another. Before, the patriot, un-
less sufficiently advanced in culture to feel his world his coun-
try, wished all countries weak, poor, and ill-governed, but his
own: he now sees in their wealth and progress a direct source
of wealth and progress to his own country. It is commerce
which is rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multi-
plying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to
it.1
AN IMPORTANT INTERSECTION between international law
and international economics was adumbrated more than a cen-
tury ago in this passage by John Stuart Mill. At that time, laissez
faire economic theory prevailed and only a rudimentary internation-
al organization existed. It was
then sufficient to ask how inter-
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have been established, and, in
fact, a new science of economic
development is aborning. Today's international juridical scientist
must determine whether and how international laws assist in build-
ing an international economic community. This community should
lead to a more integrated international political community, which
is necessary for truly effective international laws. Obviously the
process is circular - "something very much like trying to lift
oneself by one's shoestrings."2 This seems, however, to be the only
* This article is the first portion of the sequel referred to in Funk, International
Laws as Integrators and Measurement in Human Rights Debates, 3 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L 123, 158 n.137 (1971).
1J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 136 (5th London ed. 1864).
2 G. MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 280 (1960).
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way to build international systems. Similar "bootstrap integration"
processes may operate in the international legal system itself, though
these move in tighter circles.3 When the inquiry is expanded to
include international economics, it becomes necessary to consider
the interplay of three international systems: the legal, economic
and political. Though each system interacts as part of a total
world system, they may be considered separate for analytical pur-
poses. Similarly, despite the interrelation of the whole and all of
its parts, a particular sequence of interactions may be separately
analyzed and a particular starting point selected - in this case
international laws. The object of this article is to develop a set
of terms and some rudimentary theories as to how international
laws, by furthering international economic community, further in-
ternational political integration, which ultimately lends support to
international laws as well. Once the theoretical implications of
this process have been examined, empirical testing may be under-
taken to build an international juridical science in this area of con-
cern.
I. THE TERMS AND TASK
Whether integration is primarily a condition or a process has
been the subject of some controversy. For some it is a "state of
mind,"4 while others define it strictly as a "process." 5  The latter
definition suggests that systems analysis might be most useful in
understanding this concept. In systems analysis there are no end-
3 Funk, International Laws as Integrators and Measurement in Human Rights De-
bates, 3 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 123, 129-33 (1971), finds that contemporary theorists
have advanced three basic explanations of how international laws directly develop their
own support: (1) if international laws enunciate natural law principles they will be
accepted as legally binding regardless of whether they are authoritatively promulgated;
(2) the mere characterization of an international rule as a "law" secures some support
for it from an association between international and municipal laws; and (3) interna-
tional laws are self-fulfilling prophecies since the mere assertion of a rule as an inter-
national law contributes to the consciousness of policy-makers and the general public
that an international legal system exists. In addition, international laws may indirectly
develop their own support by establishing international institutions which result in in-
creased personal contacts and institutional usages.
4 Jacob & Teune, The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of
Political Community in THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 9, 10 (P.
Jacob & J. Toscano eds. 1964). Additional similar definitions are found in K. DEUTSCH
ET AL, POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA 36 (1957) (de-
velopment of a sense of "we-feeling"); A. ETZiONI, POLITICAL UNIFICATION 329, 330
(1965) (amalgamation of political units or functions and the self-maintenance of a po-
litical system).
5 E.g., E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 29 (1964) particularly advises against
"the reification of an analytical system" in this respect.
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states during the "life" of the system and all reality is part of a
process. Nevertheless, the level of affairs occurring in the real
world can be distinguished conceptually from the level of analysis
of those affairs. An observer may consider the process temporarily
stopped so that he may analyze it. Later he may consider it in
motion. Thus, on the level of observation and analysis, "integra-
tion" may be either a process or a state of affairs - producing
integration or already integrated - depending on the observational
perspective selected." It will be apparent from the context of the
discussion which has been selected here.
Integration, in its most general meaning, refers simply to bring-
ing parts together into a whole.7 Applied to social groups, integra-
tion implies some consensus formation, which has been regarded
as the primary requirement for integration.8 In any event, it is
important to distinguish the definition of integration from its specific
results, such as equal treatment and opportunity.' Similarly, the
concept of integration should be distinguished from tests or mea-
sures of its existence or the means by which it is known, such as
"making sacrifices in the common interest.''10
With respect to social groups, integration may be divided into
three separate types: social, political and economic. Social integra-
tion involves the unification of social groups which are not central
to the political or economic systems. Since these three types of
integration are related, social integration undoubtedly has some
effect on political and economic integration. The present concern,
however, is limited to political and economic integration, with the
exclusion of social integration predicated on the assumption that
its role is peripheral."
6B. BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1 (1961).
7 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1174 (P. Gove ed. 1967).
8 Siotis, The Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and
European Economic Integration: The First Ten Years, 19 INT'L ORGANIZATION 177,
178 (1965), observes that "[i)ntegration occurs when consensus formation tends to be'
come the dominant characteristic of relations among actors in a system."
9 P. STREETEN, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 17 (1964), indicates that "[wle shall
speak of an integrated society if all members of that society are treated equally, enjoy
equal opportunities, and an equal degree of liberty, and if they can to the fullest extent
achieve whatever goals they may pursue, and in particular more goods and more leisure."
10 G. MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 64 (1956). In the international
sphere "there does not exist that human solidarity which in the national state is a result
of the historical process towards integration and which induces individuals and social
groups to accept rules and regulations that are not to their own immediate advantage."
Id. at 5.
11 B. BALASSA, supra note 6, at 2, observes that social integration "increases the ef-
fectiveness of economic integration .... " But Balassa, Toward a Theory of Economic
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The amalgamation of political units constitutes political integra-
tion. In the international sphere, a result of this integration may be
the transfer of "exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-
state to some larger entity."' 2 Another result may be the diminish-
ing among States of the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key
domestic policies independently, seeking instead to make joint deci-
sions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central
organs.1
3
Various tests have been devised to measure the degree of politi-
cal integration. One index is whether "there is likelihood of internal
peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually
antagonistic claims."' 4  A further test of international political
integration is whether rules like international laws "emanate from
their own sources."'" But these tests of the existence of political
integration should be distinguished from the definition of the con-
cept itself.
The amalgamation of economic systems constitutes economic
integration. Some would limit this concept to "optimum" amal-
gamation - the degree of amalgamation considered desirable at
a given time. For example, it has been said that integration of the
various national economies is "the creation of the most desirable
structure of the international economy, removing artificial hindrances
to its optimum operation and deliberately introducing all the de-
sirable elements of coordination or unification.""' In this view,
"the problem of integration, therefore, forms part of a more general
problem, namely, that of optimum economic policy."'7  A value-
Integration in LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 21, 23 (M. Wionczek ed.
1966), follows the text in excluding social integration from the definition of integra-
tion.
12 Haas & Schmitter, Economics and Differential Patterns, of Political Integration:
Projections About Unity In Latin America, 18 INT'L ORGANIZATION 705, 710 (1964).
L. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
6 (1963) likewise identifies integration with "the process whereby political actors in
several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities
to a new center."
13 L. LINDBERG, supra note 12, at 6.
14 Haas, International Integration: The European and the Universal Process in
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 93, 94 (Anchor Books ed. 1966).
15 Garcii-Amador, Institutional Development in Central American Integration, 61
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 167, 173 (1967).
1 6 J. TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 57 (2d rev. ed.
1965).
17 Id. Tinbergen takes the term international economic integration "to mean the op-
timum of international economic cooperation," id. at 3, and defines "the state of eco-
nomic integration as the economic policy which shows an optimum of centralization."
Id. at 21. Earlier he treated international economic integration as "the creation of the
(Vol. 4: 3
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free definition of economic integration facilitates discourse in that
it becomes possible to speak of the degree of integration at a particu-
lar time as good or bad. Terms such as "over-integration" and
"under-integration" may then be utilized to relate a given degree
of integration to the optimum level. Economic integration has also
been defined in terms of equality of general economic opportunity.'8
Free trade tends to be incorporated into the application of this
definition to the international economy.'" Quite clearly it is im-
possible for separate economies to operate as one without some
equality of opportunity and lack of discrimination. However, this
is not an absolute requirement and, in any event, need not be in-
corporated into the definition of economic integration. A more
restrictive view equates economic integration with co-ordination or
balanced growth among various sectors of the economy.2 Again
it seems preferable to retain balanced growth as a separate concept
so that it may be considered in relation to economic integration.
Some economists test economic integration by measuring equali-
zation of factor prices and the extent of trade relations. But these
partial tests should not be confused with definitions. 2' The concept
of economic integration adopted here approximates "economic
union" or "total economic integration," which have been defined as
follows:
An economic union, as distinct from a common market, combines
the removal of restrictions on commodity and factor movements
with a degree of harmonization of economic, monetary, fiscal, social
and counter-cyclical policies.. . . [T]otal economic integration pre-
supposes the unification of economic, fiscal, and other policies and
most desirable structure of international economy, removing artificial hindrances to the
optimal operation and introducing deliberately all desirable elements of coordination
or unification." J. TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 95
(1964).
Is G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 11, observes that "'[e]conomic integration' is the
realization of the old Western ideal of equality of opportunity ... [namelyl the loosen-
ing of social rigidities which prevent individuals from choosing freely the conditions
of their work and life."
19 Balassa, supra note 11, at 24, finds that international economic integration "en-
compasses various measures abolishing discrimination between economic units belonging
to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence
of various forms of discrimination between national economies." B. BALASSA, supra note
6, at 2, observes that "the process of economic integration comprises measures that en-
tail the suppression of some forms of discrimination."
20 p. STREETEN, supra note 9, at 9, uses "integrated" "in the sense of co-ordinated
or balanced," though unbalance is not regarded as undesirable, so long as there is a uni-
fied policy with respect to the growth of industries, sectors, and regions.
21 See, e.g., Balassa, supra note 11, at 23, who finds equalization of factor prices
unduly restrictive as a definition. B. BALASSA, supra note 6, at 1, refers to the existence
of trade relations as merely a "sign of integration."
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requires the setting up of a supranational authority whose decisions
are binding on the member states.22
From this posture "stages" of economic integration less than eco-
nomic union can be considered steps toward economic integration
and not different types of it.23 These stages or steps are analytically
useful, but the key concept in economic integration remains the
amalgamation of economic systems.24 This amalgamation may
proceed through two different processes, which are termed "hori-
zontal" and "vertical" economic integration. Horizontal integration
is the progression from free trade area, to customs union, to com-
mon market, to economic union, and finally total economic integra-
tion.25 In contrast, "vertical" integration proceeds by economic
sectors, such as with the basic industries of steel and coal.2"
Economic integration should be clearly distinguished from several
related terms. One is "international economy' 27 which treats the
world as one economic system, but strictly from an economic view-
point in the modern sense. "International political economy" im-
plies a study of the international economy from a broader policy
perspective. Finally, "international economic community" assumes
that there is considerable economic integration already existing in
the international economy, analogous to that found in the European
Economic Community. 8
The phrase "international economic community law" has been
22 Balassa, supra note 11, at 25.
23 B. BALASSA, supra note 6, at 2, is followed and summarized in Nye, Central
American Regional Integration, 570 INT'L CONCILIATION 1 (1967) as follows:
International economic integration - a more complex level of interdepen-
dence - includes a number of means of expanding market size by abolishing
discrimination between economic factors belonging to different national states.
These are generally ranked in theory from the lesser interdependence of a free
trade area (abolition of internal tariffs among members) to customs unions (the
addition of a common external tariff) to common market (the addition of
free movement of labor and capital) to economic union (the addition of co-
ordination of monetary and fiscal policy) to the greatest interdependence of
total economic integration (the unification of economic policies). Id. at 8.
24 For an extended discussion of various definitions of economic integration see,
Balassa, supra note 11, at 22-25.
25 For types of horizontal integration see, supra note 23; B. BALASSA, supra note 6,
at ix; and Balassa, supra note 11, at 25.
26 For the sectoral approach see, B. BALASSA, supra note 6, at 15-16; and L. LIND-
BERG, supra note 12, at 10.
27 See generally G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 9-11.
28 In each of these terms, "international" excludes the Communist world since eco-
nomic integration between free and planned economies currently presents such for-




deliberately coined for this article. It is meant to refer to those
laws which emanate from the political organs of an international
economic community. Thus the present area of concern may be
distinguished from two somewhat similar legal specialties. One is
known as "international economic law" and considers the legal
regulations affecting economic intercourse. More specifically, it
deals with the relevant provisions of international law, including
the operational regulations and administrative practices of inter-
governmental economic organizations concerned with foreign trade
and international payments, and any municipal laws relevant to this
subject matter."9  In the United States this would be known as the
law of international trade or business, or international transactions.
The other related legal specialty is called "international economic
development law." This has been described as: "a body of prin-
ciples determining the legal relationships of developing countries
with foreign investors, and with national and international public
development aid institutions. This field includes the principles of
control over natural resources, the status of foreign investors, the
legal character of concession agreements and the principles of com-
pensation. ''3 These concerns are to be contrasted to the present
29 Hexner, Book Review, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 503-04 (1959).
G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 213 (1962),
suggests that "International Economic Law may be defined as the branch of Public
International Law concerned with the ownership and exploitation of natural resources;
the production and distribution of goods; currency and finance; related services as well
as the status and organization of those dealing therewith." Schwarzenberger, The
Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, 117 HAGUE ACAD. RECUEIL
DES COURS 1, 7 (1966). Subfields of international economic law as defined by Pro-
fessor Schwarzenberger include: international labour law, international social law, inter-
national transport law, and the law of international copyright and design. Id. at 8.
However, mere harmonization of municipal laws relating to a particular subject matter
does not make them a field of international law. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra at
213-14.
Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BuT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20-51
(1957), treats the "Commercial Law of Nations" as a Law Merchant common to civi-
lized nations and governing interpretation and enforcement of private international
"treaties" such as those involving transnational sales of goods.
30W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 374
(1964). However, see Friedmann, The Relevance of International Law to the Processes
of Economic and Social Development, 60 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 8, 10
(1966), where international economic development law is broadened to "the new inter-
national law of economic and social development." Feliciano, Comments on 'The Rele-
vance of International Law to the Development Process," 60 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRO-
CEEDINGS 15, 17 (1966), views "the international law of economic development as a
process of clarifying and implementing common interests of senders and receivers in re-
spect of maintaining, perhaps accelerating, and regulating the stream of capital and
technology across state boundaries." But see Fatouros, Comments on International Law
and Economic Development, 60 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 18 (1966), who
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inquiry which deals with the role of international laws in interna-
tional economic community development and the consequent impli-
cations for international laws. The term "economic community
law" often appears in connection with the European Economic
Community. It has also been applied to the development of new
rules in the Central American Common Market3' and the Latin
American Free Trade Association.32 Usually economic community
law is assumed to be a natural concomitant of economic community,
and these two phenomena do appear to be mutually supportive.
Similarly international economic community law apparently stands
in this same dual relation to international economic community.
This article uses "international laws" where "international law"
usually would be found. "International law" is a term that is used
in a number of different senses, whereas "international laws" is
more clearly limited to rules that are accepted because they are
made by authorized lawmakers. Thus "international laws" are the
primary rules of Professor Hart in an international context." While
true that the sanctions which oblige subjects of international laws
to obey or endure the penalty may be peculiar to the diffused inter-
national system, we have already passed the stage where every
international legal rule must receive the specific consent of all those
bound by it. Thus it does not seem too early to use some such
term.
"International laws" should also connote an association with
domestic legislation. This connotation identifies the primary rules
themselves as possible integrators, rather than some institutional
aspect of the international legal system. Of course it is sometimes
hard to decide whether a particular international agreement is an
international law or merely jus dispositivum. General laws enable
argues that though development is of international concern, it is a national process, and
hence, there is no such thing as international development.
Had Professor Friedmann not already used the term, "international development"
could have referred to the growth of the international economy as a whole. Perhaps
"international economic aid law" then would have been a more accurate label for the
problems of lesser developed countries.
31 Gracfa-Amador, supra note 15, at 173.
32 Orrego-Vicufia, Developments in the Latin American Free Trade Association, 61
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 174, 180 (1967), observes that "we are in the pres-
ence of an incipient community law, characterized by autonomous legal instruments
that emanate from the organs of the Association."
33 Funk, supra note 3, at 125. "International laws" is especially appropriate in
the present context since treaties predominate in the field of international economic
law. Schwarzenberger, supra note 29, at 12; G. SCI-IWARZENBERGER, supra note 29, at
214. See also id. at 36, 64, where it is suggested that international customary law is
derived from treaties to a greater extent than is commonly recognized.
[Vol. 4: 3
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private individuals in domestic legal systems to arrange their affairs
by making private contracts. Clearly these arrangements are not
laws.34  Some international treaties are indeed "private" bilateral
acts of international actors as subjects of more general international
laws under which they are arranging their affairs. However, other
"agreements" are really legislative acts in a diffused international
system. Whether a given international agreement falls into the
one category or the other depends on the surrounding circumstances;
even the distinction between multilateral and bilateral treaties will
not always be determinative.
The circular process whereby international laws help establish
their own supports has sometimes been referred to as lifting oneself
by one's own bootstraps3' and the analogy has been applied spe-
cifically to the growth of international integration."6 This circular
analogy emphasizes the interrelationships involved in international
systems. Linear cause and effect relationships are easier to compre-
hend because rational thought itself follows linear forms. But,
to the extent that linear relationships do not adequately represent
the realities of international life, they tend to mislead rather than
illuminate. A familiar example of a circular process occurs in
building a fire. The heat from the initial match increases the draft
which in turn intensifies the heat until large logs are burning. Com-
munications engineers have observed an analogous process in elec-
tronic feedback. Though this proceeds at a more accelerated rate,
there is a similar sequence of mutual amplification. The phrase
"cumulative circular causation" seems particularly apt in charac-
terizing this process in a social setting.!7  The process has been
described as follows:
3 4 H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27 (1961).
35 Funk, supra note 3, at 123 n.3.
.
3 6 G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 53 explains:
[A)dmitting the undoubted truth that the gradual realization of a world com-
munity will need people with changed attitudes, it is also true that it is most
difficult to change attitudes, except by conditioning people through their life
and work within the framework of a changed society .... The social scientist
is then exposing the difficulty that all reformers meet. Every induced social
change has to follow the pattern of lifting oneself by one's bootstraps: society
with its forms and norms has to be altered pari passu with the people ....
37 G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 15, refers to "the social mechanism of cumulative
causation which I believe has a wide if not universal application." He finds that "[fi]n
the cumulative social process, economic progress, equalization of opportunities, and po-
litical democracy are interrelated by circular causation, each one being both cause and
effect of the others." G. MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 153. See also Riggs, Economic De-
velopment and Local Administration: A Study in Circular Causation, 3 PHILLIPINES
J. PUB. AD. 86-146 (1959).
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The underlying fact is the existence of such an interdependence
between all the factors in a social system that any change in any
one of the factors will cause changes in the other factors; these
secondary changes are generally of a nature to support the initial
change; through a process of interactions, where change in one
factor continuously will be supported by reactions of the other
factors, the whole system will have been given a momentum to
move in the direction of the primary change, though much fur-
ther. 8S
This phenomenon has been identified under many different names.
For some it is a "deviatlon-amplifying mutual causal relationship. '3 9
Another talks about "automaticity" as the high probability of "spill-
over and its complementary processes,"'40 and the concepts of
"spillover" and the probability of "automatic politization" have
been applied specifically to economic unions.4' Others speak of
"self-organizing systems."42  In each case, change is being explained
in terms of cumulative circular causation, the model thus appearing
to entail all of the above descriptions.
This model of social causation is not without its dangers, how-
ever. It is easy to accept its automaticity too readily. An initial
change in a system may also build up forces which "damp" or
reverse it and tend toward homeostasis. Additionally, the tempta-
tion of trying to explain everything in terms of everything else
should be avoided. If a process is completely circular, anything in
it may be considered as the initial change which leads to the end
result. Finally, a monistic urge must be acknowledged which ap-
parently makes us want to see diverse elements as parts of one
38 G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 16.
39 Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
361, 385 n.114 (1970).
40 Schmitter, Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration, 23
INT'L ORGANIZATION 161, 164 (1969). Schmitter further states that "[tlhe process
of spillover has a cumulative tendency." Id. at 165.
41 Haas & Schmitter, supra note 12, at 716, 720 passim. Boulding, The Concept of
World Interest, in ECONOMICS AND THE IDEA OF MANKIND 41, 61 (B. Hoselitz ed.
1965), finds that "[i]n the history of the building of nations from local communities
a complex interaction can be traced in which webs of trade, law, police, and loyalties
constantly grow by reinforcing one another" and "[w)e can now reasonably expect this
process to be repeated on the world scale." Kitamura, Economic Theory and the Eco-
nomic Integration of Underdeveloped Regions, in LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTE-
GRATION 42, 45 (M. Wionczek ed. 1964), observes that "LoInce a form of international
integration is established, there will always be an inherent tendency to move into a
higher form of integration." But cf. note 78 infira for another "spillover effect."
42 Dechart, Positive Feedback in Political and International Systems, 9 AM. BEHAv-
IORAL SCIENTIST 8, 9-10 (1966). See also id. at 11, on "self-generated social change
and development."
43 E. HAAS, supra note 5, at 62.
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system. The cumulative circular causation model is useful only
if its elements are truly related, so the desire for simple explanation
must not cause us to see more interrelatedness than is actually war-
ranted.
The ultimate goal of this inquiry is to develop a satisfactory ex-
planatory theory. How to proceed has previously been epitomized:
"As in the development of all new knowledge, one begins with
hunches, applies them to empirical data, and reorders the original
hunches into stable propositions based on empirical evidence."4
Each step is essential. In fact, the author of one early attempt to
proceed without an adequate theory admitted this to be "a meth-
odological weakness."4 The same defect hampered an attempt to
deal with variables related to regional integration.46 The authors
admit that they produced "aggregate data innocent of an informing
model or theory. '4 7  Although these studies isolated variables they
did not adequately explain associations. They provided a useful
beginning but the next step-requires more rigorous theory-building.
Admittedly the "school" 4" of political scientists carrying on this
work is pursuing a broader question than the one at issue here.
They are asking what factors aid integration, whereas this inquiry
deals only with whether international laws aid integration. The
political scientist is left the task of fitting specific findings con-
cerning international laws into their more general theories. The
crucial questions here are how international laws aid international
economic community development and how this, in turn, leads to
political community with more binding international laws.49 So
far the best work on these issues has come from political scientists,
economists, and sociologists. But international legal scholars must
build on this if they want to understand the social role of their own
44 Esman, Institution-Building in National Development, in DYNAMIcs OF DE-
VELOPMENT 140, 145 (H. Gove ed. 1964).
45 Schmitter, supra note 40, at 161.
46 Barrera & Haas, The Operationalization of Some Variables Related to Regional
Integration: A Research Note, 23 INT'L ORGANIZATION 150-60 (1969).
47 Id. at 159.
48 Mario Barrera, Leon N. Lindberg, Philippe C. Schmitter and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
all appear to be former students of Ernst B. Haas and share some of his research in-
terests and points of view.
49 So far much of the work on the role of laws as integrators has been limited to
national and regional economic community development. Any theoretical suggestions
applicable to the international context as well, however, have been taken into account.
Nevertheless, no attempt will be made in this article to determine whether laws oper-
ate as integrators in roughly the same way in each of these three contexts.
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discipline.' Some might claim that such an inquiry belongs more
appropriately to international economics. This discipline has made
great progress as a social science since the days of Adam Smith and
John Stuart Mill. However, until fairly recently, most economists
have been too busy developing their science to investigate thoroughly
the relation of economics to the other social sciences. Even an
economic historian has commented that "[t]he last great book
covering this wide range was John Stuart Mill's Principles of Politi-
cal Economy, published in 1848."51 Moreover, he observed that
"the sociologists have left the study of economic institutions to the
economists, while the economists have left the subject to the sociolo-
gists." '5 2 Even an economist with broader training than most ap-
parently was satisfied to indicate points of contact between his
theory of economic integration and political factors. He called
attention to the need for coordinated action, but left the political
implications to the political scientists.5" In the second quarter of
the 20th century most economists apparently abandoned the study
of economic effects of legislation to the legal scholars." But it
can not be merely a historical accident that Adam Smith was a moral
philosopher and also lectured on jurisprudence. 5  Perhaps the
new development economists will reestablish the relationship of
economics to social and political forces.5 6 Meanwhile the juridical
scientist should be able to make a unique contribution by analyzing
thoroughly the role of laws in these processes.
The question of how international laws help to produce inter-
national economic integration and how this in turn helps to produce
international political integration has been dealt with heretofore
in general terms. Economists have observed that political integra-
50 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER? xi, 4 (1970), notes the
necessity of supplementing the statics of international economic law with its dynamics.
Multilateral treaties were explored from the standpoints of duration, exclusion of reser-
vations, possibility of renunciation, exception clauses, escape clauses and the verifiable
character of assertions of contingencies mentioned in these clauses to test the eligibility of
particular rules as constituent parts of an international economic order. Id. at 67.
51 W. LEWIS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 5 (1970).
521d. at 12.
5 B. BALASSA, supra note 6, at 7.
54 W. LEwIS, supra note 51, at 12. One wonders how many legal scholars actually
took up the study. One notable example is Professor Katz, who offers a course on Law
and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School. Katz, Economics and the
Study of Law: The Contribution of Henry C. Simons, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 1-4 (1946).
5 5 A. SMITH, LECtURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND ARMs (E. Cannan ed.
1896).




tion leads to economic integration and that this in turn reacts on
the political sphere. 57  This sequence has been observed in the
contexts of GATT," the United Nations Regional Economic Com-
missions,59 and the European Economic Community.' But the
advance of theory depends on probing more specifically into how
this process operates. For purposes of analysis, the process may be
divided into two segments, the first being the determination of pre-
cisely how international laws help to produce international economic
integration."
II. FROM INTERNATIONAL LAWS TO
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
There are at least four major mechanisms by which international
57 B. BALASSA, supra note 6, at 7, claims that "[political motives may prompt
the first step in economic integration, but economic integration also reacts on the polit-
ical sphere; similarly, if the initial motives are economic, the need for political unity
can arise at a later stage." Fenwick, Remarks on "Economic Aspects of Latin American
Integration," 61 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L PROCEEDINGS 185 (1967), referred to "the de-
velopment of a new type of international law which, rather than being concerned with
the regulation of conflicting interests, dealt with the co-ordination of common inter-
ests" and finds that "lilt is this development in international law which will permit
economic integration, and, it is hoped, will lead to the breaking down of political hos-
tilities between states." Id.
5 8 G. CuRZoN, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 335 (1965), observes
that "[ain optimistic view would be that we are only at the very beginning of a world
trade evolution which will integrate ever more closely the countries of this world and
thus make a major contribution to world peace."
59 Gregg, The United Nations Regional Economic Commissions and Integration in
the Underdeveloped Regions, 20 INT'L ORGANIZATION 208 (1966), finds that "ft~he
emphasis is upon economic integration ... because it is a necessary antecedent to polit-
ical integration."
60 Hay, International and Supranational Organizations: Some Problems of Concep-
tualization, 1965 U. ILL LF. 733-34, with respect to the transition from bureaucracy to
political decisionmaking, concludes that "experience with the European Communities
dispels the first doubt and, instead, lends support to the expectation that successful and
complete economic integration will produce subsequent political integration." But cf.
id. at 770, to the effect that "[slupranationalism need not lead to political integration."
B. LANDHEER, ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 19 (1966), notes that "the organizational forms of world society will ultimately
have to become totally different from those of the nation-state. . . . The nation-state
has a centralizing function; world society can only aim at decentralization." Id.
61 This leaves out of consideration one special variety of international economic inte-
gration which could come about through greatly increased cartel agreements among
private business corporations with increasingly international operations rather than in-
ternational laws. For example, Jay, International Co-ordination For National Economic
Growth, 40 POLITICAL Q. 137, 149 (1969), calls the international company "perhaps
the principal agent of international economic integration." If governmental controls
were limited primarily to municipal laws, this organization of the international economy
by companies to suit themselves could be considered international laissez faire with a
vengeance. It is doubtful whether modern States would permit this situation to de-
velop. In fact Schwarzenberger, supra note 29, at 3, observes that "the non-Communist
world seeks to find substitutes on the level of organized cooperation for the lost autonoma-
tism of laissez-faire economics."
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laws actively aid the creation of international economic community.62
First, laws may lead to centralized economic planning. As Gunnar
Myrdal has observed:
There is in all planning, even if it were ever so earthily rooted in
comprehensive studies of facts, an element of belief in reason as an
independent force in history and in the freedom of choice by which
man can change reality according to his design and so turn the
course of future development. In essence, planning is an exercise
in a non-deterministic concept of history . . .6
The same principle applies with even more force to law-making.
The very process of consciously creating laws introduces an element
of rationalism into the situation. This is likely to be reflected in
more rational goals such as broad international economic integration
as opposed to temporary accommodation of trade problems. There
is also a tendency to provide for equal treatment of situations in
defined categories as opposed to ad hoc solutions. There is more
stress on general values.6 4 In a word, diplomatic negotiation may
produce short-run gains through "splitting the difference"; but in-
ternational laws introduce more firm rational principles on which
international economic community can be built.
Second, international laws can further economic integration by
providing a focus for diffuse domestic interests in economic in-
ternationalism. This helps to counterbalance specific domestic in-
terests which benefit from protectionism. National policymakers
are, therefore, free to proceed faster toward international economic
integration because they are able to point to the obligations of their
State under international laws as a reason for opposing special
business interests. Thus economic integration may gain some sup-
port from those who favor obedience to laws generally. This
utilizes respect for municipal law to gain support for interna-
tionalism. Both of these mechanisms have been observed operating
in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and
62 Analytically, international laws instrumental in furthering international economic
community may be distinguished from those which merely contain concrete measures
regulating the trade which follows from international economic integration. In prac-
tice a given measure in multilateral treaty form may be both cause and effect of further
international economic community.
63 G. MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 7.
64 G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 53, observes that these are "closer to basic ideals
and, consequently, more liberal and generous than the diversified valuations determin-
ing behavior in everyday life."
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GATT.65 They may be used to build international economic com-
munity as well.
Third, international laws may remove domestic impediments
to world trade. The early merchant adventurers somehow managed
to carry on international trade despite municipal restrictions like
medieval tolls and the regulations accompanying the mercantile
system.6 The underlying theory of GATT is to combat analogous
modern remnants of this kind of regulation in order to facilitate
world trade and eventual international economic integration.
Finally, as municipal restrictions were removed from world
trade, the later merchant adventurers also benefited from the de-
velopment of a relatively uniform law merchant and some basic
rules of international law; international laws may add to this legal
framework for international trade and thus enable trade relations
to increase. International commercial laws may provide additional
-common rules" in a developing international law merchant.17  In
particular, an international legal framework for economic relations
may facilitate factor movements. One major advantage of colo-
nialism as an economic system was the protection of capital move-
ments between the mother country and the colony by predictable
laws. 8 Today domestic laws in the host countries may provide a
favorable investment climate to encourage factor transfers to some
extent. But international laws may also alleviate problems of in-
651. KRAvis, DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 20
(1963).
66 J. CONDLIFFE, THE COMMERCE o NATIONS 11-131 (1950).
6 7 Rbpke, Economic Order and International Law, 86 HAGUE ACAD. RECUEIL DES
COURs 203,218 (1954), points out that:
An intensive economic exchange which implies a wide range of the division
of labour and thereby a high degree of mutual dependence of individuals is
impossible unless . . . we feel that we can rely upon a moral, legal and institu-
tional framework which, formally and materially, protects exchange relations
and the claims deriving from it. Otherwise, we can hardly be expected to
bear the enormous risks involved.
In order for extensive world trade to be possible, there must be a suitable currency and
"an unimpeachable legal order and beyond this, an unwritten but generally recognized
code of norms, principles and rules of behavior and value ideas ... [so that] all mem-
bers of the community know how to be sheltered by a minimum of reciprocal confidence
and by an atmosphere of security and continuity." Id. See Mann, supra note 29,
passim. Cf. Philip, Social Aspects of European Economic Cooperation, 76 INT'L LAB.
REv. 244, 254-55 (1957), that "the economic unification of Europe requires not only
the lowering of customs barriers but the establishment, in an extended market, of com-
mon rules applied through common institutions."
68 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
200 (1969), recalls "the advantages for investors resulting from the colonialism and
imperialism of bygone days - a reasonably assured continuity of public order and an
effective legal system producing a favorable investment climate." J. TINBERGEN, supra
note 16, at 32.
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ternational investment. For example, they may provide better means
for settling disputes between international investors and host coun-
tries.69 Also, an international insurance program would provide
one method of protecting capital investments.70 Finally, improved
international industrial property laws facilitate combined capital
and technology transfers.7 ' Solution of problems such as these is
partly a matter of harmonizing domestic laws. But international
laws may provide an independent international legal order for in-
ternational trade.7" This serves the cause, not only of national
development, but of international economic community development
as well. By the same token it may be argued that international
laws could facilitate international labor movements too. At one
time these were significant factor movements. However, they have
virtually ceased and now offer little chance of helping to integrate
the world economy.7" If the trend toward one world culture some-
day makes significant labor migrations possible, national human
rights standards applicable to immigrant groups, for example, would
facilitate such migrations. In that event international laws would
have fostered another step toward international economic integra-
tion by building a legal ordering framework.
A fifth, though minor, means by which international laws aid
international economic integration is associated with the compilation
of international economic statistics. It is hard to conceive of sub-
stantial progress toward international economic. integration without
this information. In theory, it could be collected and compiled by
a private organization operating under domestic laws. In practice,
it is easier for international institutions created by international laws
to carry on this work. It could be argued that international institu-
tions, not international laws, are making the contribution to inter-
national economic integration here. But at least international laws
are indirectly responsible since they establish the institutions which
6 9 See, e.g., G. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING (1967); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note
68, passim.
70 E. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES 280 (1965).
71 McQuade, Transnational Transactions, Technology and the Law: An Analysis of
Current Trends, 44 DENVER L.J. 327-43 (1967). Fatouros, supra note 30, at 21.
72 See W. R6PKE, INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 72 (G.
Trinks, J. Taylor & C. Kiufer transls. 1959).
73 G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 2, observes that -[labor migration has ceased to
function as a factor of integration even between the advanced countries and offers no




gather and compile the information. Meanwhile, through the in-
troduction of rationalism, supporting internationalism, providing an
ordering framework, and freeing trade and labor movements, inter-
national laws are making a direct contribution to international eco-
nomic integration.
II1. FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITY LAW
The examination of mechanisms by which international laws can
build international economic integration is a first step toward a
theory of international economic community law. Another element
which must be considered is the feedback of the above process -
ways in which international economic integration facilitates political
integration and support for international laws. Several of these fol-
low from functionalism, which suggests that cooperation in solving
common problems comes to provide "its own dynamic" and leads to
structural change.74 Another functionalist proposition would sug-
gest that as people start working together on specific and limited
goals they become more willing to expand them into general institu-
tions. Functionalist arguments may be subdivided into two basic
positions. "Private functionalism" sees private citizens working to-
gether and becoming more likely to support political integration as
a result. "Public functionalism" sees contact between various offi-
cial representatives of States or international organizations as the
key factor. In private functionalism the arena of cooperation may
be international trade. Incipient international economic integration
leads to increased personal contacts among those engaged in this
trade. Public functionalism, in turn, includes two different view-
points. One sees contact among officials of States as furthering in-
ternational political integration. The other sees contact among
members of an international bureaucracy as the main integrative fac-
tor. International economic integration should provide a fertile
field for cooperation on specific programs among both types of offi-
cials. One paradox in public functionalism, however, is that inter-
action among State officials 5 probably leads less surely to political
integration, though it has more influence on national policies. Con-
versely, interaction among international bureaucrats probably creates
a stronger bloc for political integration, while having less influence
74 J. SEWELL, FUNCTIONALISM AND WORLD POLITICS 132 (1966).
75 Cf. L. LINDBERG, supra note 12, at 286, which describes this process at work
among national representatives to the European Economic Community.
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on the national policy decisions necessary to bring it about. In any
event, public functionalism is based on an "iron law of bureau-
cracy": bureaucrats automatically strengthen the goals they serve by
"mediating governmental positions and upgrading common inter-
ests."'76  Conflicts are resolved through this upgrading of common
interests and expansion of tasks77 primarily by virtue of the "spill-
over hypothesis. '78  In order for this process to proceed, the initial
tasks assigned must be defined neither too precisely nor too vague-
ly.79 Of course, if spillback occurs, any resulting political integra-
tion will be short-lived.8° Unfortunately, the typical draftsman of
international legal documents is trained to seek the most limited
objectives possible with the maximum precision.8' If he is to achieve
lasting spillover, however, he must restrain these tendencies, because
it is loosely defined, broad tasks and somewhat loose phraseology
which enable bureaucracy to push for further expansion of authority
in the direction of increased political integration.82
International economic integration becomes international politi-
cal integration through a second set of forces: those by which eco-
nomic planning becomes policy. It has already been noted that law
may lead to planning; but planning may also lead to law. There
76 Nye, supra note 23, at 61.
77 Id. at 12.
78 Haas, supra note 14, at 95-96. Schmitter, supra note 40, at 162-64. This spill-
over hypothesis should not be confused with the "spillover effect" which Professor Fisher
applies to a transfer of support from municipal laws to international laws. See Funk,
supra note 3, at 130 n.33 & accompanying text. See Siotis, supra note 8, at 179, which
defines spillover as "the crossing of the threshhold from one level to another."
79 Nye, supra note 23, at 61, found that spillover requires "specific tasks that con-
tinuously involved the other tasks with which the governments were concerned."
8 0 Nye, Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration, 19 INT'L ORGANIZATION
870, 880, 886 (1965).
81 G. SCHWARZHNBERGER, supra note 68, at 152, identifies "one of the classic rules
of legal planning: to aim at the minimum of legal restraint required or attainable in a
particular historical situation."
82 Dechart, supra note 42, at 9, describes this process as follows:
[The World Bank, ILO, FAO and others] have followed the customary growth
pattern of all self-organizing systems with an increase not only in size but in
the functional differentiation and articulation of their components. As these
more or less autonomous systems increasingly articulate among themselves the
relational web of the world community becomes ever more dense. This pro-
cess is currently in a phase of early and very rapid development. It possesses
an internal dynamic for growth since almost any international initiative today
creates new bonds, or develops existing bonds between the most diverse institu-
tions.... [W]hat may be arising is a new homonoia, based in part upon task
orientation, based in part upon a common scientific culture. Insofar as these
bonds form institutional patterns they are amenable to formal description as a
constitution. This is a living and developing constitution which may even-
tually provide the key element in a worldwide "rule of law."
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may be a conscious desire to confer more power on central political
institutions in order to obtain the increased advantages of economic
unity, 8s but the trend toward international political integration may
be an almost unconscious outgrowth of the international economic
planning process itself." This has been called "a continued drift
toward supranationality," so that economic planning is "the chief
candidate for integrative functions in the future system."85  The
term "gradual politization" - where, from initial technical and
noncontroversial programs, the actors turn to broader, more politi-
cal, means of accomplishing them - has also been applied to this
process.8 6 Thus economic union moves quite naturally toward
political union. The general acceptance of planning in national
economies may facilitate this process on the international level.
Today, rational interference with market forces is by no means
confined to the "planned" economies; it is now commonplace in
welfare capitalism and developing countries. In addition, the day
of laissez faire economies appears to be over, not only nationally,
but internationally as well. People are no longer satisfied with
merely removing artificial barriers to trade. In fact, only those who
derive some early benefits from free trade are willing to stop there.
The lesser developed countries want "rational" interference with
the free play of market forces to achieve specific goals. But this
requires institutions to choose ends and means as well as to institute
and administer specific programs. In a word, some sort of inter-
national political institution becomes necessary to carry out the
planning function which likely began on a purely economic level.
Thus an international economic community, by its own internal
logic, moves on toward international political community. Put in
terms of the economic history of the United States, it may be said
that "[ijn international economics, we are passing from the age of
the Sherman Act to the age of the progressive income tax.' '87
83 See generally Professor Ernst B. Haas as quoted in L. LINDBERG, supra note 12,
at 290, that "[o nce governments have committed themselves . . . to certain common
measures of fundamental importance to the daily lives of their entire citizenry, they
can resolve future problems of implementing the agreement only by means of further
delegation of power to the center ......
84 L. LINDBERG, supra note 12, at 290, has observed this phenomenon in the Euro-
pean Economic Community as follows: "[o]nce involved in an undertaking of this
magnitude, the Six have found it difficult to avoid moving farther and faster than orig-
inally planned."
8 5 E. HAAs, supra note 5, at 292.
85 Haas & Schmitter, supra note 12, at 707.
87 Chayes, Legal Institutions of the International Economy, 1967 UTAH L. REv.
331, 341.
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Eventually economic planning virtually implies some sort of political
action88 and economic integration virtually implies economic plan-
ning.89  Planning generally proceeds in phases, by "successive ap-
proximation" in choosing provisional targets and optimal factor
allocations.9 But someone must make these choices so that some
political solution eventually is required.
Many observers have noted the need for international political
integration to carry out the planning required by international
economic integration. 1 They argue correctly that political decisions
eventually must be made on many matters of economic policy. This
includes the "distributive justice" of present allocations of goods
and services to lesser developed countries. 2 Also, national develop-
88 Tinbergen, International Economic Planning, 95 DAEDALUS 530 (1966), indi-
cates that "planning will be defined as the preparation for political action, that is, action
by public authorities .... Economic planning then refers to the economic activities im-
plied, such as governmental investments and financial, commercial and other types of
economic policy."
89 See Kitamura, supra note 41, at 63, to the effect that "regional economic integra-
tion is, in essence, a matter of regional planning."
90 Tinbergen, supra note 88, at 547-50.
91 It has frequently been noted that it is necessary for international political inte-
gration to accompany complete international economic integration. B. BALASSA, Supra
note 6, at 2, states that "total economic integration presupposes the unification of
monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies and requires the setting up of a supra-
national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states." Balassa, supra
note 11, at 25. M. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
76 (1966), finds that "economic unification without political unification is inconceiv-
able." G. MYRDAL, s-upra note 2, at 265-67 observes:
[O)nce the Welfare State has come into existence in the rich Western coun-
tries, and once the underdeveloped countries are becoming independent and
are launching upon individual economic policies in the interests of their na-
tional development, there is, as a matter of fact, no alternative.to continued
international economic disintegration, except to strive for a Welfare World.
The trend towards national planning leads by a process of causation to the
creation of a need for international coordination and planning .... The insti-
tutional forms which offer themselves for international coordination and plan-
ning are the inter-governmental organizations.
W. R6PKE, supra note 72, at 105, indicates that "a collectivist order which brings the
economy entirely under political control presupposes a state corresponding to the sphere
of planning." He explains that "an international planned economy ... representing as
it does the domination of politics over ecoomics on an international level, cannot man-
age with the international quasi-order of the liberal epoch but presupposes a real super
state." Id. at 78. R6pke, supra note 67, at 211, observes that economic integration
"presupposes a corresponding extra-economic integration (social-political-moral-insti-
tutional-legal integration," and "under no economic system can economic integration
go further than social-political-moral-legal integration which is based on psychological
forces, on laws, and on institutions."
92 Myrdal, Development and Underdevelopment in LEADING ISSUES IN DEVEL-
OPMENT ECONOMICS 346 (G. Meier ed. 1964), finds that "[elconomic development has
to be brought about by policy interferences." Chayes, supra note 87, at 343, observes
that "[a] claim for redistribution is an assertion of community." But cf. Metzger,
Development of Rules Relating to International Trade, 59 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRO-
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ment plans require coordination," especially in the agricultural
sector."4 The growth of international business corporations re-
quires international political organizations to regulate their activi-
ties properly.9" Ideally, international trade requires a world currency
and this, in turn, requires a world state.9" Even present world
economic agencies need further coordination;" an overall interna-
tional development plan is urgently needed. 8 However, it is a
common mistake to assume that these needs will be widely recog-
nized and that what is needed necessarily will come to pass. In
fact, some observers are pessimistic about the prospects for inter-
national economic planning, whether needed or not.99  Theoretical
discussion cannot settle this factual issue. Whether international
CEEDINGS 28, 49 (1965), that aid to lesser developed countries is merely a new trade
preference.
93 Tinbergen, sapra note 88, at 556.
94 Kitamura, supra note 41, at 57.
" Edwards, The Internationality of Economic Interests, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 183-93
(1962). Jay, supra note 61, at 149.
906 J. TINBERGEN, supra note 16, at 84.
97 Tinbergen, supra note 88, at 544-46.
9 8 J. TINBERGEN, supra note 16, at 94. Tinbergen, Wanted: A World Development
Plan, 22 INT'L ORGANIZATION 417-31 (1968).
99 Balassa, supra note 11, at 28-29, concludes that "coordination of economic poli-
cies amounts to abandonment of sovereignty in favor of a world organization to an ex-
tent that is unlikely to be undertaken - at least in the near future." Kitamura, supra
note 41, at 58, finds that "the political preconditions for the necessary adjustments in
the exercise of national sovereignty are still lacking." W. ROPKE, supra note 72, at
109, states that "the Nation is the highest geographical political level, on which a col-
lectivist economic order is possible." R6pke, supra note 67, at 227, explains that "an
international collectivist order, being an order which amounts to a thorough 'politisa-
tion' of economic life, requires a degree of international government which would
largely exceed that which the liberal age could achieve." "Since a world State is clearly
out of the question, a worldwide system of planning is to be ruled out as a practical
possibility." Id. at 241. In fact the "paradox of international collectivism" is that:
On the one hand, it makes an international State an absolute necessity while,
on the other hand, it makes its attainment, which is most difficult at any time,
impossible for the very reason that the international government which inter-
national collectivism calls for is to be a collectivist one which, as such, must be
highly centralized, riding roughshod over the national susceptibilities and ways
of life.
Id. at 244. Therefore "the nation must be regarded as the highest political and geo-
graphical level at which a collectivist economic order is possible." ld. at 246. G.
MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 157, concludes:
In spite of all the hopeful publicity about international economic integration
here and there in the world, the main trend towards economic nationalism
is unbroken, and the driving forces behind this trend are the very policies of
national planning which in the individual nations, are so necessary for prog-
ress and have had such wholesome results at home.
But cf. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 30, at 15, for the more hopeful view that the inter-
national commodity agreement is the "establishment of a degree of managed trade eco-
nomy for such commodities."
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economic integration will lead to international political integration
through the need for international economic planning is yet to be
proved. Theoretical analysis may isolate the issues and set forth
some explanatory relationships among variables, but empirical
testing may disclose intervening variables or determine that suspected
relationships in fact do not exist. So what seems in theory to be
a natural progression from economic planning to policy, may turn
out not to be so "natural" after all.
Thirdly, international economic integration leads to international
political integration as a result of increased economic interdepen-
dence. As international economic specialization takes place, autarchy
declines and this raises for every State what has been called "the
gradually rising price of disruption.' 100 As a result, inter-State
conflict outside of international institutions should gradually decline,
and conflicts adjusted more frequently within such institutions. In
addition, increased interdependence of national economies makes
increased international cooperation necessary to prevent transmission
of undesirable cyclical fluctuations from one economy to another."'
Thus increasing economic interdependence should accelerate the
cumulative circular causation process leading to political integration.
Finally, international economic integration increases international
homogeneity which in turn makes political integration easier. The
point has been made, perhaps too forcefully, that the developed
nations are pulling away from the underdeveloped ones in overall
economic development. But as one observer points out: "[vjirtually
all underdeveloped countries have at least one large city, and some
have several, in which the architecture, the transportation, the
boulevards, the bars, the nightclubs, and restaurants, and even the
technology seem much the same as in Europe or North America.
' 102
Though economic integration may accentuate quantitative differ-
ences, it may increase qualitative similarities in life style, at least
in the elite and urban sectors. Political integration apparently
requires a certain "minimum homogeneity' '113 and the overall effect
of economic integration is to increase homogeneity. To be sure
100 Nye, supra note 80, at 872.
101 Wexler, The Theory and Reality of Economic Integration, 14 WORLD POL.
553, 559 (1962).
10 2 B. HIGGINS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11 (rev. ed. 1968).
103 Hay, supra note 60, at 770. Cf. Hozelitz, Unity and Diversity in Economic
Structure, in ECONOMICS AND THE IDEA OF MANKIND 63, 78 (B. Hozelitz ed. 1965).
See also Wionczek, Introduction: Requisites for Viable Integration, in LATIN AMER-
ICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 3, 13 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966).
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history records many instances of conflict between similar peoples
as well as between dissimilar ones. Nevertheless, increasing simi-
larity of life style through economic integration removes one barrier,
and probably provides a bridge, to political integration.
The role of sheer wealth resulting from increased international
specialization and economies of scale is much more problematical.
It has been said that "[o]nly in an expanding world economy will
there exist the conditions for mutual generosity without which the
integration process would not get far."1 4  Perhaps the desire for
wealth makes economic integration more attractive."0 5 But economic
wealth per se is probably not as significant an aid to political in-
tegration as functionalism, economic planning, interdependence and
homogeneity.
IV. THE DOUBLE INTEGRATION PROCESS
The discussion thus far has analyzed portions of the integration
process as separate steps and has assumed a progression from in-
ternational laws, to economic integration, to political integration,
to more binding international laws. Some questions may be asked
now about this process as a whole. There are those, for example,
who treat the process as very nearly automatic and refer to "auto-
matic politization" and its conditions.0 A theory of causation
utilizing an "automatic" process may be useful in isolating condi-
tions of integration but is not very satisfying as an explanation.
10 4 G. MYRDAL, supra note 10, at 51.
105 Waddington, The Desire for Material Progress as a World Ordering System, 95
DABDALUS 666-73 (1966).
10 6 Barrera & Haas, supra note 46, at 150-5 1. if:. Nye, supra note 80, at 882, as
follows:
Perhaps there are two links to look for between economic and political union
in developing areas: first, the nine pattern variables which establish the precon-
ditions for political action, which would bring states "up to the brink"; and
second, some outside actors or events which would provide the will power
to leap from the brink to the other side rather than allow spillback. But if
this is true, can we be satisfied until we have attempted to examine these
"ouside actors or events"?
Nye, supra note 23, at 59, warns:
[1]f a larger sense of political community of common loyalties, does not grow
at a rate commensurate with the politization of integration, the result may be
stagnation or (if functionalists are correct about the linkage between sectors)
a cumulative retrogression or "spillback" until the institutions and tasks of
integration are at a level that the prevailing sense of community, expectations,
and interests can support. Such was the case with the Common Market in East
Africa where the sense of regional community or loyalty was not sufficient to
support the high level of economic integration that had been achieved under
colonial rule.
Cf. supra note 80.
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Once concurrence of antecedent and subsequent variables has been
discovered, one naturally wonders why they should occur auto-
matically in a certain sequence. Thus, analysis of the integration
process should move beyond association toward explanation if pos-
sible.
It is appropriate for one interested primarily in international
laws to initially consider the feedback loop as beginning and ending
with these laws. However, he must ultimately ask whether the
cumulative circular causation process may just as well begin and end
at some other point. It has been said that regional economic in-
tegration may begin equally well in any field of economic activity.'
If the international integration process is truly circular, it may also
begin at various points in the cycle. It is just as perilous to assume
a single catalyst out of hand as to assume that all events are equally
effective. However, if there are necessary first steps, it is appropriate
to ask whether international laws may be one of them.
Another question is whether the cumulative circular causation
process under discussion here is unilinear or alternating. The
"spillover effect" has already been encountered,"0 8 but so has the
possibility of "spillback."' 5  This would indicate that the process
is alternating, but there still may be an overall direction after smaller
fluctuations cancel each other out. On the other hand, the interna-
tional integration process may be fluctuating both in detail and
general direction. In that case, questions could be raised concerning
the factors outside the cumulative circular causation process which
induce spillover as opposed to spillback and those that affect the
overall direction of the process.
Finally, some steps in the cumulative circular causation process
may be accomplished more easily than others. For example, eco-
nomic integration is said to be easier to achieve than political inte-
gration.."0 One observer cites the failures of the European Defense
107 Kitamura, supra note 41, at 46.
108 Supra notes 40 & 78.
109 Supra note 106.
1 10 Blough, The Furtherance of Economic Development, 19 INT'L ORGANIZATION
562, 565 (1965), observes:
International economic cooperation is easier to achieve than political coopera-
tion because the national interests of different countries are less difficult to
harmonize in economic than in political matters. International economic co-
operation can provide not only the negative benefits of avoiding conflict but
also the positive benefits of increasing welfare in all countries.
Hexner, supra note 29, at 504, concluded that "[w~hereas in the area of 'political' in-
tercourse national governments display excessive sensitiveness in defense of their 'domes-
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Community and the European Political Community, in contrast to
the success of the European Economic Community, as proof of this
proposition.' The desire for material progress has been called
"a world ordering system" itself. 112  It remains to be seen whether
international laws on economic matters are the best place to begin
the cumulative circular causation process. But at least this proce-
dure would avoid "the legalistic frontal attack on sovereignty that
federalists advocate.""'  When this aspect of the double integra-
tion process, as well as its automaticity, beginning point, and direc-
tional characteristics are more fully understood, it may be possible
to provide satisfying answers to questions such as these.
V. AN EMPIRICAL TEST PROPOSAL
Though adequate theory is the first step toward international
juridical science, it can only test the validity of propositions like the
foregoing for internal consistency. The next step must be empirical
testing. Properly controlled empirical inquiry should provide ad-
ditional knowledge of the international integration process and the
specific ways in which it operates. If international laws interact
with international economic and political integration as indicated
above, there should be some concrete instances where they can be
shown to be doing so.
An example of this interaction may be the growth of shared
community perspectives on aid to lesser developed countries. One
might expect a demonstrable succession from initial resolutions,
through increasing incorporation of lesser developed economies
into a world economy, to a greater role for lesser developed coun-
tries in international institutions, with more binding international
laws evidencing a new consensus supporting aid. What started in
the spirit of balancing advantages or ultimate self-interest should be
turning into a nearly universal obligation simply to share some
economic resources. There are those who say something like this is
happening. Harold Lasswell sees international laws as "crystal-
lizing expectations" of aid by lesser developed countries, so that
the language in international bodies becomes "more saturated with
tic domains,' they accepted (and frequently welcomed) within the framework of the
new organizations interference in their budgetary, exchange, and trade policies."
11 Hay, supra note 60, at 734 n.6.
112 Waddington, supra note 105, at 673, observes that "it is only by concentrating
their attention on the material future that mankind can discover a community of in-
terest which could serve as an adequate basis for a world order."
113 Nye, supra note 23, at 10.
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words and phrases of obligation, approximating the conventional
discourse of [a] statute or treaty.""' 4 It has been suggested that
the growing international obligation of developed countries to share
resources is balanced by a concomitant international obligation of
lesser developed countries to promote their own development as
best they can." 5 The former proposition indicates a growing sense
of community, which has been called a key index to political inte-
gration." 6  Even though these processes are still developing" 7 it
has been suggested that they are "the most important new departure
in contemporary international law and organization." '118 Of course,
statements of authorities, no matter how perceptive or experienced,
are not very convincing proof of attitude changes.119 However,
economic measurements may provide a more objective index. For
example, the rate of transactions between countries has been con-
sidered as one measure of the "prospects of integration"'2 0 and
trade measurements have been used to indicate the transaction rate.
Studies of this type have already been used in the EEC to measure
political integration.12' Some observers have even used international
economic relations as the primary measuring rod of economic inte-
gration.' Another index of economic integration may be the de-
114 Lasswell, The Relevance of International Law to the Development Process, 60
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoCEEDINGS 1, 5 (1966). Schwarzenberger, supra note 29, at 9,
notes that "the principle of international good-neighborliness, vague and shadowy in
the Charter of the. United Nations, has obtained a concrete meaning and remarkable
vitality when transformed, for instance, in the GATT and OECD Conventions and
bilateral agreements on development aid into the standard of economic good-neighbor-
liness."
115 Fatouros, supra note 30, at 20.
116 Nye, supra note 23, at 5 n.1.
117 Feliciano, supra note 30, at 16, concludes that "[tihe policy which would re-
quire assistance from those capable of extending it reflects expectations which have not
as yet received the same enshrinement in the language of law and obligation which the
minimum coercion principle has."
118 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 30, at 8.
119 See, e.g., Funk, supra note 3, at 156 n.135, 161, where an authoritative state-
ment is compared with the results of an application of methods of content analysis.
120 Barrera & Haas, supra note 46, at 156.
121 Alker & Puchala, Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area,
1928-1963, in QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 287, 288 (J. Singer ed. 1968).
122 Weiller, Les degr~s de l'intigration et les chances d'une 'zone de coopiration'
internationale, 1933 REVUE ECONOMIQUE 233. Schneider, Lineamenti di una tjoria
economica del mercato comune, 1957 REVISTA ECONOMICA DE SCIENZE ECONOMICHE
E COMMERCIALI 107-08. Cf. Reinton, International Structure and International In-
tegration: The Case of Latin America, 1967 J. PEACE RESEARCH 334-65 which uses
"terms of trade, airborne transport, participation in continental meetings, negotiations,
and participation in World Wars," as measures of interaction.
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gree of equality of factor prices'" after adjustments for other
influences affecting them.124 In some such fashion, the degree of
economic integration should be susceptible of fairly precise eco-
nomic measurement.
It has already been observed that "a claim to redistribution is
an assertion of community.' 2 5  If this is so, the impact of interna-
tional laws on this claim should be demonstrable. The resulting
growth of economic and political community should in turn de-
monstrably strengthen international laws. It is only necessary to
devise and execute some empirical tests to measure these relation-
ships. If they are successful, they should reveal the growth of in-
ternational economic community law, at least with respect to sharing
resources with developing countries. This in turn may furnish an
example of the interaction of international laws and international
economic integration to produce an international political com-
munity. 2 6
123 Nye, supra note 23, at 5 n.1.
124 Balassa, supra note 11, at 23.
125 Chayes, supra note 87, at 343.
1 26The author expects to carry this study forward by first devising a quantitative
measure of international economic laws, and then applying it to multilateral economic
treaties to see if international laws lead first to increased international trade and then
to increased obligations to aid lesser developed countries.
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